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Why is Democracy Elusive in the Middle East?
Jeannie Sowers
Department of Political Science
In the aftermath of 9/11, discussions about counter-terrorism quickly veered into broader concerns about the absence of democracy in the Middle East 
as a “root cause” of terrorist movements. The Bush  
Administration made “democratizing” the region by 
force one of the key justifications for pre-emptive war in 
Iraq, despite the fact that most regional analysts argued 
that a prolonged American occupation of Iraq would 
reduce prospects for democracy. 
This has indeed been the case. The war in Iraq now 
has regional repercussions that rival those of the Israeli-
Palestinian-Arab conflict. For instance, Iraqis now con-
stitute the second largest refugee population in the Mid-
dle East after the Palestinians. Over two million Iraqis, 
as well as many Palestinian refugees who settled in Iraq, 
have fled to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. These 
countries, with scarce resources, are tightening controls 
on refugees, who are leaving Iraq at an estimated rate 
of several thousand per day. Over two million Iraqis are 
internally displaced and unable to leave.1 
In addition, U.S. pressure on such different regimes 
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to pursue political reforms 
has evaporated as the Iraqi situation deteriorates. These 
governments have employed new restrictive laws and 
simple coercion to limit the activities of both secular 
and Islamist opponents. As chaos spreads in Iraq, the 
growing clout of Iran and the U.S.’s disengagement from 
the Arab-Israeli peace process have further destabilized 
the region. 
In this context, official American rhetoric about 
promoting democracy comes across to most Middle 
Easterners as insincere at best and callous at worst, even 
though many in the Middle East openly admire the 
American people and American democratic institu-
tions. Public opinion polls consistently show that signif-
icant majorities of Middle Easterners favor democratic 
government for their own countries.
A Comparative Politics Approach
So why, the recent and tragic developments aside, has 
democratization thus far eluded the region? Scholars 
of comparative politics sometimes approach the prob-
lem of democratization by breaking it down into more 
bounded questions and seeking common patterns 
across a range of cases. How do authoritarian regimes 
come to power and manage to stay there? What roles 
do civil society or external actors play in challenging 
authoritarian rule? 
In answering such questions, we find that we can ex-
plain the scarcity of democracy in the Middle East with-
out resorting to the idea that the Middle East is some-
how inherently resistant to democracy. It is misleading, 
in my view, to argue that Arab political culture or Islam 
are unchanging or inherently undemocratic. Instead, if 
we look at both past and present trends, we find long-
standing patterns of external intervention, weak parlia-
ments and strong executives, and a variety of popular 
movements that have advocated more representative, 
accountable government. 
Colonial Rule and Weak Democratic 
Institutions
The Middle East has been subject to unusually signifi-
cant levels of external intervention. The central political 
drama of the late 19th century and the first half of the 
20th century in the Middle East was the emergence of 
movements for “constitutionalism” and against external 
rule. Reformers in the Ottoman Empire, North Africa, 
and Iran wanted to create popularly elected parliaments 
and adopt a written constitution to constrain the power 
of the ruler. Despite these desires, from the early 1800’s 
until the 1950’s, the region was the object of virtually 
continuous attempts at direct and indirect control by 
European powers. At different times, the British con-
trolled Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Palestine; the French 
ruled with varying degrees of success in Lebanon, Syria, 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria; the Italians decimated 
much of the domestic population of Libya, and the  
1 For more information on the Iraqi refugee crisis, see reports by Human 
Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and the International Crisis Group  
(www.icg.org). 
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Russians and British played for influence in Iran—much 
as they did further a field in Central Asia.
External powers faced periodic, popular revolts 
against the colonial presence, and all used violence and 
co-optation of local elites to sustain their position. They 
also established monarchies or presidential systems 
with deliberately weak parliaments, as was the case in 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Egypt. Colo-
nial powers and local rulers alike sought to limit the ef-
fectiveness and scope of parliamentary authority.
In addition, early Middle Eastern states were poor. 
Great differences in wealth and power divided society 
into relatively small numbers of elites and much greater 
numbers of poorer people. These popular classes in-
creasingly joined in formal political life in the 1930’s 
and 1940’s through the creation of mass-based move-
ments that called for an end to colonial rule and for 
more authentic and representative governments.  
Middle Easterners marched in the streets, organized  
political parties of all sorts, voted in elections where  
given the chance, and waged insurgencies when no po-
litical outlets emerged. Many were imprisoned,  
executed, and exiled in the process. 
Colonial advisers and local rulers, concerned with 
controlling vast rural hinterlands and unruly cities, 
strengthened the armed forces and established new 
internal security forces. These came to occupy a privi-
leged place within national economies and political life. 
In Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf 
states, monarchs succeeded in creating family dynas-
ties despite recurrent opposition. Elsewhere, in Egypt, 
Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia, cliques of army officers 
eventually overthrew the colonial orders, perceived by 
most citizens as corrupt, ineffectual, and elitist. 
The Growth of the State
Many of these army officers were populist—that is, they 
appealed to vast numbers of ‘citizens’ who had seeming-
ly gained little under weak parliamentary governments. 
They rapidly expanded central state bureaucracies to 
consolidate control and enact ambitious plans for state-
led development. They centralized the apparatus of the 
state in the capital city and around the institution of the 
president or monarch himself. Many leaders also culti-
vated support among the poorer segments of society by 
undertaking programs of land redistribution, expand-
ing educational opportunities, and creating jobs in the 
growing public bureaucracies. 
Some emerging Middle Eastern states could draw 
on revenues from oil and foreign military aid to con-
solidate their political systems. In Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and small states of the Gulf, the nationalization of oil 
companies channeled increasingly large sums of money 
directly into the coffers of incumbent governments and 
families. (Nationalization of oil production was widely 
popular, as previously the vast majority of oil profits 
went to a cartel of foreign multinationals). Other coun-
tries, such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Iran, were able 
to maneuver throughout the Cold War between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union to obtain significant influxes of 
military hardware and economic aid, disproportion-
ate to the size of their economies or their populations. 
The U.S. continues to arm Saudi Arabia, the small Gulf 
states, Israel, and Egypt by arranging for billions in 
subsidized loans that, in most cases, must be used to 
purchase U.S. military equipment.
Downsizing the State, Manipulating 
Politics
Over the last few decades, authoritarian rulers have 
faced greater challenges in maintaining their monopo-
lies over political power. Since the 1970’s, states have 
found they can no longer provide enough jobs, educa-
tional opportunities, and basic services to still rapidly 
increasing populations. Regimes both democratic and 
authoritarian have downsized and privatized. This  
process, still underway, is producing an increasingly  
diversified and vibrant private sector and increasing 
economic inequality as old forms of state support for 
the poor are withdrawn. Regimes have also experiment-
ed with new forms of political control, allowing small 
numbers of officially sanctioned parties to contest elec-
tions. Many of these elections are rigged or otherwise 
manipulated to ensure that the government’s favored 
party maintains majorities in parliament and in other 
institutions such as professional associations and clubs. 
The Islamist Trend
Some of the most successful movements in contesting 
even rigged elections, have been groups and organiza-
tions that define themselves as part of a broader Islamic 
resurgence. Islamist movements and networks have 
benefited from the failures of state elites to provide ba-
sic services, address corruption, and safeguard human 
rights. Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim, a respected academic and 
secular democratic activist in Egypt who was recently 
released after several years in Egyptian jails, echoed the 
consensus of many analysts within the region when he 
We Hold These Truths
wrote recently that “mainstream Islamists with broad 
social support, developed civic dispositions, and ser-
vices to provide are the most likely actors in building a 
new Middle East. Whether we like it or not, these are 
the facts.”2 
At the end of the Cold War, hopes that the Middle 
East would finally be released from the machinations 
of great powers interested in oil and strategic real estate 
were short-lived. As suggested at the beginning, the U.S. 
“war on terror” has been counterproductive thus far for 
democratization prospects in the region. But conditions 
in the region are in flux. On a recent trip to Cairo, I 
found many Egyptians outspoken and frank about  
the incompetence of the ruling party and the system  
of presidential patronage that underpins it. Some feel 
that change is inevitable. A recent college graduate,  
active in the Kifaya (Enough!) movement, told me that  
“Democracy is only a matter of time. The only questions 
are when and at what price. But it will happen.” 
What Can the U.S. Do?
What could the U.S. do to help promote rather than 
hinder democratization in the Middle East? The United 
States could work diligently to solve regional and civil 
conflicts, but only by recognizing the legitimacy of 
diverse interests and viewpoints, a task that has eluded 
several recent administrations. The United States could 
condition its military and economic aid on substantive 
political reforms and regional conflict-problem solving, 
something that the U.S. has thus far been unwilling to 
do except in token and small-scale ways. 
As for Iraq, we face dismal options from a misguided 
intervention. The U.S. could signal its recognition of the 
costs to both Iraqis and the region by addressing the 
mounting humanitarian crisis in concrete and visible 
ways. For instance, on the refugee question alone, the 
U.S. could dramatically increase its assistance to such 
organizations as the United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) and accept large numbers of Iraqi refugees 
rather than the token hundreds that have so far been 
admitted. 
Interested in learning more?
At UNH:
•	 Courses	on	the	Middle	East	and/or	Islam	are	taught	
by Alasdair Drysdale (Geography), Ethel Sara Wolper 
(History) and myself (Political Science), among  
others. 
•	 Arabic	is	currently	being	offered	through	the	 
Languages, Literatures, and Cultures Department.
On the Internet:
•	 For	up-to-date	analysis	of	developments	based	on	re-
search in the field, check out the Middle East  
Research and Information Project (www.merip.org) 
and the periodic reports by the International Crisis 
Group (www.icg.org).
•	 For	information	on	U.S.	foreign	policy	and	foreign	
aid, check out the bipartisan reports by the Congres-
sional Research Service. Although supposedly  
restricted to members of Congress, most find their 
way online. The reference desk at Diamond Library 
can also help locate them. 
•	 There	are	many	English-language	newspapers	and	
news outlets from the Middle East on the web. Here 
are some of the major ones. (I am not endorsing any 
of the content.)
 Al Ahram Weekly (Egypt, English),  
www.weekly.ahram.org.eg
 Al Jazeera, English edition, english.aljazeera.net
 Arab News (Saudi Arabia, English),  
www.arabnews.com
 The Daily Star (Egypt edition, English),  
www.dailystaregypt.com
 The Daily Star (Lebanon, English),  
www.dailystar.com.lb
 Haaretz (Israel, English), www.haaretzdaily.com
•	 Blogs: Blogging is taking off and authoritarian  
governments take it seriously. Egypt, for instance,  
recently imprisoned several young bloggers on 
charges of “defaming the state.” These can be found 
through major search engines.
2 Quoted in “Democratizing the Middle East?” Occasional Paper No. 2, The 
Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University. Report of a 
conference held at Tufts University, Medford/Somerville, MA, January 26–27, 
2006. 
